INTRODUCTION
Coal is both the major fuel for China's econo mic development and the major so urce of its severe air pollution. C hina's reliance on coal for nearly three-qua rters of its primary energy has contributed to loca l air poll ution, regional acid rain a nd global climate cha nge. At the same time, the country's coa l consumption has electrified its growing cities and helped Chinese steel and chemical industries to become internationa l powerhouses.
This contribution considers how the intertwined issues of environmental reform and economic reform have a ffected efforts to reduce coal-related air pollution in China. Our analysis focuses on government efforts to promote the diffusion of cleaner coal techno logies (CCTs) among industria l state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We utilize a framework of 'fragmented a uth oritariani sm' (Lieberth al and Oksenberg, 1988) fo r our investigatio n of CCT-related policies, examinin g the cha nging relati onships among central a nd local government actors and enterprises during the past decade of economic reforms. We also examine how economic reforms have influenced environmental policy development at the centre, environmental policy implementatio n at the loca l level, a nd the response of enterprises to these cha nging policies. Fragmented authoritarianism helps explain why, despite government efforts to promote technologies that reduce coal-related ai r pollutio n in C hina, the diffusion of CCT has been slow.
We a rgue that the poor diffusion of CCT has been due to: ( I) conflicting int erests in policy develo pment amo ng ce ntra l govern ment agencies; (2) tensions between central a nd loca l governments in po licy implementat ion; and (3) a lack of strong incentives for enterpri ses to adopt CCT. Although so luti o ns to C hina's coa l-related pollution problems require integrated planning of environmental , energy a nd economic policies, central government S1ephanie B. Ohshita and Leonard Orlolano decisio n m a king on CCT is fragmented . Promoting the diffusion of CCT requires acti ve involve ment of loca l governments, but po licies do not yet add ress the shifting ba la nce of power from central to loca l governments which has been spurred by eco no mic reform. In addition , centra l government po licies fo r CCT have no t sufficiently considered the growing autono my o f SO Es no r the fin a ncia l pressures they fa ce from economic reforms.
Cleaner Coal Technology in China
T he terms 'clea n coal techno logy' a nd 'cleaner coal techno logy' encompass a wide ra nge of equipment a nd methods a imed at reducing po llutio n from coal prepa rati o n a nd utilizati o n.' Gi ve n the d ominance of coa l in China 's do mestic energy mi x, CCT represents a pragm atic strategy fo r po llution reduction. Broadly spea king, CCTs can be divided into four ca tego ries according to the stage of coa l fl ow at which they a re applied : pre-combustion , co nversion, co mbu stio n a nd post-combusti o n. Table I summa rizes the techno logies in each category, a lo ng with their enviro nmenta l a nd energy o bjectives.
The p re-combusti o n techno logies in Table I include coa l washing, briq uetting a nd coa l-water mi xt ure (CWM) technologies. Coa l washing is the most widespread fo rm of CCT in Chin a; briquettes fo r residential use are a lso co mm o n. Am o ng co nve rsio n technologies, coa l gasification for the productio n of town gas has been o n the increase in C hina and helps to red uce loca l a ir po llutio n in cities. With nea rly 500,000 industria l boilers in C hin a , improvements in combustion effi ciency could produce significa nt enviro nmenta l benefits. Flue gas desulphurization (FGD) technology, often referred to as a 'scrubber', is the ma in type of post-combustion CCT.
Fo r illustrati ve purposes, we focus o n two types of CCT in this contribution: coa l washing, a pre-combustio n technology; a nd FGD, a post-combustion techno logy. Coal washing has relati vely low costs and yields multiple environmenta l a nd energy conse rvati o n benefits by reducing the sulfur and ash conte nt of coa l. Howeve r, waste water a nd sludge fro m coal washing mu st be ma naged pro perl y to avoid se rio us water a nd land po llutio n problems. Co mpa red to coa l washing, FGD techno logy has high sulfur rem ova l efficiency, but it is a n end-of-pipe po llutio n co ntro l techn o logy focused solely on the rem oval of sulphur di ox ide (S0 2 ) . Adva nced FGD units ca n remove as much as 99 per cent of S0 2 but units are costly a nd co nsume large amounts of ene rgy a nd ma te ria ls. Capita l costs of FGD techno logy may be ten times hig her th a n coa l washing techno logy, and o perating costs a re two to three times higher (CC P UA a nd E PRI, 2000).
Improved cokin g techno logy, adva nced pyro lysis techn ology, o rga nic ch emica l production Circul ating fluidi zed bed bo iler (CFB), CF B with sulphur remova l, pressurized fluidi zed bed co mbu sti on (PF BC) Flue gas deskulphurization (FGD), electrosta tic precipitatio n (ESP) Use of ash in fertilizer a nd bricks
No te: Technologies exam ined in thi s paper a re no ted in bold. S ource : O hshita (2003 : 36) .
OBJECTIVES
Remove debris, ash (20-50%), sulphur (40 -50%); improve coal quality a nd combustio n effici ency; co nserve wa ter Sha pe coa l fo r more efficient combu stion; inco rpora te sulphur remova l agent Improve ease of ha ndling; incorporate sulphur remova l agent; CWM as o il alternative in industrial boi lers Liquefi ed coal as an a ltern ati ve to o il Gasified coal as a n a lterna tive to na tural gas; reduce residential po llutio n (by using coa l gas rather than direct coa l combusti o n); improve effi cien cy a nd reduce pollutio n fro m electric power ge neratio n Improve effi ciency and reduce emi ssio ns of S0 2 , NOx, pa rticulates, volatile organics, etc. from metallurgical a nd chemica l industries Improve efficiency; reduce C0 2 emissio ns; red uce emi ssio ns of S0 2 , NOx, particulates, a nd other pollut a nts Reduce emi ssions of S0 2 (75 -99%) a nd pa rticula tes Reduce solid waste 
Stephanie B. Ohshita and L eonard Ortolano

The Fragmented Authoritarianism Model
For decades, Chinese scholars have used the 'fragmented authoritarianism ' model to help explain policy design and implementation within Chi na durin g post-Mao economic reform s (see, for example, Lieberthal , 1992; Lieberthal a nd Oksenberg, 1988; Wang, 1995) . This model argues that, despite views of C hina as a stron g, centrally-dominated developmental state, decision-making power in much of the Chinese burea ucracy is di sjointed a nd fragmented . Th e mod el also hold s that th e fragmentation is structura ll y b ased and ha s increa sed during th e reform period . Conseq uently, ba rga ining has become increasingly important in efforts to attain policy consensus. The followin g elements contribute to the fragmentation of a uthority within the C hinese administrative system:
• Organization of bureaucracies into hierarchical, functional systems (xitong) with vertical reporting relationships known as tiao. This structure a ll ows aut hority in a particular policy arena , such as environmental protection, to fl ow ve rtically from the mini steria l level (such as the State Environmental Protection Administration or SEPA) down through counterpart orga nizations (in thi s case, environmental protection bureaus or E PBs) at lowe r levels.
• Territoria l or kuai reporting relationships in which a governmental organizat ion at the sub-nationa l level reports to the local governmental leadershi p at that level (for example, the reporting relationship of a municipal E PB to the mayor of the municipality) .
• The bureaucratic ranking system , under which an agency with a pa rticular rank is unable to exert a uthority over other governmental organizations havin g the sa me or higher rank.
• Fiscal decentra lization , in which budgeta ry authority has devolved to loca l levels thereby enabling many local burea ucratic units to acquire 'extra-budgetary funds. ' • Decentralized decision -makin g a uthority, in which the central government has delegated increased respo nsibilities for decision making to loca l governments a nd enterprises in a n effort to improve the economy.
The fragmented a uthoritarianism model has been most successfu lly used to explain decision making in economic burea ucracies, pa rticula rly at the central level government (Naughton, 1992) . Bargaining behaviour resulting from the fragmented struct ure of public ad ministration is most often observed when tangible reso urces are invol ved (s uch as la rge investment projects) a nd there is leeway in how a policy ca n be impl emented (Liebert hal, 1992: 18) . Scholars exa minin g agencies at loca l levels of government a nd in non-economic po licy arenas have provided further nuance a nd highlighted the model's limitati ons. For example, Walder (1992) emph asizes that barga ining between municipal governments an d enterpri ses over financial fl ows stems no t so much from fragmentation of authority, but from efforts to reduce risks and provide equitable resource distribution during the transition from central planning to a socialist market economy. Manion (1992) , in a study of personnel policy, finds that if a policy is vague or inconsistent with other directives faced by local government, it is unlikely to be implemented. This finding is supported by research on environmental policy implementation in China (Ma and Ortolano, 2000; Sinkule and Ortolano, 1995) .
The fragmented authoritarianism model , along with some of its extensions and critiques, has explanatory power for the case of CCT-related policy design and implementation by China's environmental administration . Two aspects of the model are particularly useful in analysing the diffusion of CCT: the structure of bureaucratic authority; and changes in incentives that have accompanied fiscal decentralization and enterprise deregulation. As we will show, the outcomes of bargaining processes on a particular issue sometimes yield policy inconsistencies with significant consequences for the ability to diffuse CCT. We will also show that fiscal decentralization and enterprise deregulation have given industrial SOEs incentives to prioritize profit maximization, which sometimes comes at the expense of investments in environmental protection . Moreover, because of their ability to extract greater extrabudgetary funds from enterprises, local governments have financial incentives to prioritize economic development over environmental protection.
Subsequent sections of this contribution exa mine fragmented authoritarianism in the behaviour of three sets of actors pertinent to the diffusion of CCT: central agencies, local governments and industrial state-owned enterprises. The fragmentation of a uthority for energy and environmental policy among national ministries is discussed in detail in the next section. The analysis then considers central-local government tensions in policy implementation, which relate directly to the decentralization of authority for decision making in the fragmented authoritarianism model. The remaining sections examine changing incentives for SOEs to adopt two types of CCT: coal washing and flue gas desulphurization.
FRAGMENTED DECISION-MAKING AT THE CENTRE
Chinese central government decision making related to CCT is fragmented and dispersed among severa l ministries and commissions. In the absence of a single energy agency, the State Development and Plann ing Commission (SDPC) led broad policies on energy pricing and the structure of energy supply in the 1990s. Jurisdiction over CCT-related policies shifted during the 1990s, with the most significant changes occurring in 1998. The 1998 reforms sought to address some long-standing problems of China's central government administration: the overlap of responsibilities and competition among agencies, conflicts of interest caused by the mixing of government and business functions, and inefficiency due to overstaffing and excessively large government offices (CESTT, 1998) . The number of ministries and commissions was reduced from forty to twenty-nine, and the number of staff was cut by half withjn the following three-year period. The 1998 restructuring gave prominence to environmental protection by elevating the former National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) to just half a rank below ministerial level. The former Environmental Protection Committee of the State Council , which had often advocated different priorities than SEPA, was disbanded (ERM China, 1998) . While these were hopeful signs for strengthening of environmental administration, economic commissions, planning commissions, and industrial bureaus continued to have stronger connections to enterprises and greater influence over enterprise technology adoption.
Administrative restructuring has reduced , but not eliminated, fragmentation of central government policy making on energy and environment. This o utcome is particularly evident in the efforts of SEPA to implement a programme of so2 fees that would give coal-consuming industries strong incentives to reduce air pollution , through the adoption of production process changes and end-of-pipe controls.
Tensions in Policy Development: The S0 2 Fee Programme Since the beginning of the post-Mao period, China's environmental administration ha s advocated the collection of emission fees from enterprises discharging S0 2 and other pollutants in excess of national standards. If emission fees are set high enough, they can motivate pollution reduction in two ways. First, high fees can encourage enterprises to cut their emissions and meet national sta ndards because doing so eliminates the need to pay fees. Second, revenues generated from emission fees can be used to subsidize enterprise adoption of pollution control equipment through grants or lowinterest loan s. The evolution of the S0 2 fees policy and the promotion. of FG D is shown in Table 2 . After some ea rly trials, fees on S0 2 and other polluta nts in Ch in a were the subject of a 1982 regulation (State Council, 1982) . The fee programme was expanded in 1988, when EPBs began to make loans of po llutio n fee money to support enterprises in installing pollution control eq uipment (State Council, 1988) . Notwithstanding these regulations, the effects of the so2 fee programme were modest beca use the fees -0.04 yua n (0.5 us cents) 3 per kg of so2 -were much lower than the cost of installing and operating control equipment. Enterprises found it cheaper to pay the fees and keep polluting rather than control pollution .
During NEPA's efforts to promote higher S0 2 fees and otherwise strengthen a ir pollution control requirements were given a significant boost in 1997 and 1998 when Premier Zhu Rongji and the State Council were briefed on the negative effects of air pollution on the economy. As one exa mple of the economic costs of outdoor air pollution, Chinese researchers estimated th at emissions of S0 2 and particulate matter caused an annual loss of 95 billion yuan (US$ 11.4 billion) in terms of human health damages, a loss of 1.6 per cent of GOP (Gao and Li , 1999: 145) . A widely cited World Bank study (1997) gave similar estimates. As a result of these and other economic studies, China's top leadership became increasingly interested in attempting to curb air pollution beca use of its adverse economic effects.
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Action came in January 1998, when the State Council approved NEPA's plan on the 'Two Control Zones' for acid rain a nd air pollution control (State Co uncil, 1998; SEPA, SDPC, et al. , 1998) . The State Council's approval aut horized the collection of so2 fees of 0.2 yuan per kg so2 beyond the 1992 trial areas. These fees were to be collected from enterprises exceeding emissio n limits within the acid rain a nd air pollution control zones (Minchener et al. , 1999: 561 ; State Council , 1998) . The higher fees have still not been widely implemented , however, even though they are below the cost of installing and operating pollution control equipment, because local officials a re concerned about possible adverse effects on the eco nomy.
6 Local government resi stance to collection of S0 2 fees led SEPA to issue another notice in 2000, emphasizing that the State Council had approved the higher fees of 0.2 yuan per kg so2 and that local governments must collect them (SEPA , 2000) . 4 . The fact that the Env ironmenta l Protectio n Commi ssio n supported SEPA's positio n is noteworthy because the Commissio n (d isbanded in 1998) and SEPA (then NEPA) had frequently disagreed on environmental priorit ies a nd projects. See Vermeer (1998: 977 The struggle to implement the S0 2 fee programme illustrates how policy negot iations among central government agencies with different priorities resulted in weak policy signa ls and poor CCT diffusion. Without the higher S0 2 fees advocated by SEPA, industrial enterprises had little incentive to invest in CCT. Even after fees were raised , CCT diffusion was slowed beca use of loca l government resistance to implementing centrally-issued pollution control policies that were inconsistent with local development goals.
CENTRAL-LOCAL TENS IONS IN POLICY IMPLEMENTATIO N
Local implementation of central government policy -especially environmental policy -is crucial for the promotion of CCT. Local governments are obliged to carry out central government environmental directives, but they a lso have strong incentives to promote loca l eco nomic development (Oi, 1999) . This central-loca l tension is rooted in the organizational structure of China 's environmental bureaucracy. Figure I illustrates the relationships among central and local government agencies relevant to CCT policy.
Loca l EPBs report vertically to SEPA (t iao relationship), but must also report horizontally to local industrial bureaus and planning commissions (kuai relationship). The necessity of working with pro-development agencies of local government can make it difficult for EPBs to achieve environmental goa ls. Often local agencies promoting eco nomic development have larger budgets, more staff a nd greater political strength than local EPBs. Mayors o r ot her high-ranking loca l officials can a lso strongly influence EPB activi t y. As a result, local agencies and leaders may win out over the EPB if central environmenta l directives appear to conflict with local economic objecti ves.
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Economic reforms of the 1990s intensified central-local government tensions linked to CCT. Policies promoting CCT call for investment in new technology by enterprises, especially SOEs. However, SOEs must have approval of their supervising government agency to invest in CCT. As more and more SOEs shifted from central government control to supervi sion by loca l governments, their financia l performance became increa singly important to local governments. China's major tax reform in 1994, which redistributed tax revenues between the central and local government , made local officials especially keen on en hancing their budgets.
8 Because they were allowed to keep a major portion of taxes from the enterprises they controlled, local governments had incentives to increase enterprise profits.
7. Fo r furth er discussion, see Jahiel ( 1998); Ma ( 1997) ; Ma and Ortolan o (2000) ; Sinkule a nd Ortola no ( 1995). 8. For details o n the 1994 tax refo rm, see Cao et al. (1999) . For local government response to ta x reforms, see Oi ( 1999) . The 1995 budget law gave local governments a further incentive to improve the fi nancia l performance of enterprises under their supervision. This law prohibited the central government from deficit financing its current account and it required a ll levels of local government to have balanced budgets (Cao et al. , 1999) . The 1994 tax reform coupled with the 1995 budget law made loca l officials scrutinize enterprise investments more carefu lly, especially investments in techno logy like CCT that might not generate a return during the loca l officials' term s of office.
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In general, the 1990s econo mic reforms aimed at industrial SOEs significantly reduced the abi lity of unprofitable enterpri ses to rely on government bailouts, and the reforms forced enterpri ses (a nd the loca l governments overseei ng them) to face ha rd budget constraints (Cao et al. , 1999; La rdy, 1998) . Because the reforms also made it more difficult for SOEs to access credit, they di scouraged many SOEs fro m engaging in pollution control activities that might red uce net revenues or require large loa ns.
10 The implication fo r CCT 9. Beca use top-level local offi cia ls a re typi ca lly assigned to a pa rticul a r loca tio n fo r only a few yea rs befo re bein g tra nsferred , they tend to prefer investments with paybacks durin g t heir terms of o ffi ce. See a lso BECo n and PN L ( 1996). I 0. Tightened mo netary po licy in 1993 decreased the rate of new loa ns to SOEs and subsequent ba nkin g refo rm s also made loa n cri teri a more stringent.
adoption was that industrial enterprises only had incentives to adopt technologies that would enhance profits or improve their competitive advantage, such as coal washing technology. Technologies with extremely high capital costssuch as FGD -were not appealing, as they required hard-to-get loans. The fragmentation of central government decision making pertaining to environment and development thus ma kes it difficult for the central government to send consistent policy signals encouraging enterprises to adopt CCT. Moreover, the impacts of reforms related to local budgets and supervision of state-owned enterprises have made both SOEs and the local governments that supervise them reluctant to invest in CCTs unless those technologies yield short-term profits.
CONFLICTING PRIORITIES, WEAK INCENTIVES: THE CASE OF FGD
This section examines how fragmented a uthoritarianism affected the diffusion of FGD, as dispersed decision making and agencies with rival objectives restricted the promotion of FGD. This case also shows that expensive, end-of-pipe pollution control technology is ge nerally at odds with the economic interests of enterprises and local governments.
During most of the 1990s, China 's central government did not have a consistent policy position on FGD. By 1998, when SDPC and the State Coal Bureau fina lly backed SEPA's push for FGD, economic reforms had diminished the ability of the central agencies to control local decision making, and local governments were not inclined to encourage investments th a t decreased enterprise profits. Consequently, FGD technology experienced limited adoption by Chinese power plants and almost no adoption by industrial enterprises.
With S0 2 emission levels rising and a ir qua lity worsening, NEPA (and later SEPA) determined that its goals for emission reduction and ambient air quality could not be met without strong controls such as FGD. NEPA's FGD requirements focused on power plants beca use they are the largest individual so urces of S0 2 • 11 Moreover, the contribution of electric power plants to total emissions of S0 2 in China has been growing. Between I 990 and 2000, so2 emissions from thermal power plants grew from 25 to nearly 50 per cent of the national total.
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Policies promoting FGD bega n with the I 995 re visions to the Air Pollution Con trol Law and subsequent S0 2 concentration standards (see Table 2 above). The push for FGD became stronger with NEPA's I 996 'Total Emi ss ions Co ntrol Policy', which called for provinces and lower II . SEPA's emphasis on FGD fo r power plants is simi lar to the approach for S0 2 control in ot her count ries. 12. Emissions stati stics from SE PA ( 1998b). For details on this estimate, see Ohshita (2003: Ch 9). levels of government to control the total amount of so2 and other polluta nts by issuing emission limits on individual so urces. Control of total emiss ions heightened the need for FGD at large emission so urces like power pla nts, but beca use of weak implementation of the total emissions control requirements, only a few FGD units were adopted. The C hina Tra ns-Century Green Project (Phase I, 1996 (Phase I, -2000 , part of the Ninth Five Year Pla n for Environmental Protection and Long-term Targets for the Year 20 I 0, identified twenty-seven FG D projects to be undertaken in areas affected by acid ra in a nd urban areas with severe air pollution (NEPA et a l. , 1997). Although the Tra ns-Century Green Project also called for FGD at large industria l enterprises, no specific projects were listed. With the approva l of NEPA's 'Two Control Zones' policy by the State Co uncil and the iss ua nce of new ther mal power plant so2 sta nd a rd s in 1998, the regu latory push fo r FGD at power pla nts was strengthened. The 1998 regul ation s required FGD at new power pla nts burning coal with sulphur content above 1 per cent. However, the regulations did not explicitly require FGD at existing power pla nts or large industrial enterprises. Local governments were given discretion to decide whether ex isting enterprises should install FGD.
NEPA's promotion of FGD was resisted by both industry a nd government , beginning with other centra l government agencies during the policymaking process. The Ministry o f Finance, SDPC, SETC and the former Mini stry of Electric Power wielded greater bureaucratic power than NEPA; when differences emerged , the o ther mini stries usually got their way in policy decisions. In the case of high-cost FGD, there was ten sion between NEPA's pollution control goals a nd SDPC's economic development o bjectives. NEPA's desire to cut p ower plant S0 2 emissions with FGD also conflicted with effo rts of SETC and the former Ministry of Electric Power to rapidly expand electric power production during the 1990s (Vermeer, 1998) . Unlike some other cleaner coal technologies, FGD lowers profits by rai sing capital a nd operating costs. Flue gas desulphurization was also at odds with SDPC and SETC energy efficiency goals, as FGD operation consumes large quantities of energy.
The limited support for FGD that eventually emerged during the 1990s can be attributed to the small area of overlap between NEPA's goals and those of other central government agencies. Estimates of the costs of p ollution damage indicated that SDPC o bjectives for macro-economic development wo uld be served by some level of S0 2 control, including FGD. Flue gas desulphurization would a lso enable new power plants to fire readily available domestic coa l rather than expensive and less-a bundan t natura l gas; the coal option was favo ured by SDPC, SETC an d the former Mini st ry of Electric Power.
13 But SDPC estimates of FGD cost led it to plan for FG D at only one-qua rter of new power plants in the Ninth F ive Year Pl a n, not for all new plants as N EPA had suggested (US Em bassy Beiji ng, 2000) .
From the perspective of Chinese state-owned enterprises, FGD is unappealing in terms of economics, operations and management. FGD can increase capital costs of a new power plant by 15 to 20 per cent, and it has high operating costs (Ohshita and Lu, 1996: 41 ) . For industrial enterprises outside of the power sector, cost increases can be even more dramatic. Because it is an end-of-pipe pollution control device, FGD offers no process benefits. Operation is complex, maintenance is demanding and re-use or disposal of waste sludge is problematic. Furthermore, FGD technology is not available domestically and must be imported, which requires identifying foreign vendors, obtaining foreign credit, completing tedious customs procedures, and working around language barriers during training. Economic reform pressures on SOEs to improve financial performance have only intensified enterprise resistance to FGD. In short, enterprises are not likely to adopt FGD if they can avoid it (Ohshita and Ortolano, 1999, 2002) .
Even when forced to adopt FGD by regulation , Chinese SOEs have had difficulty obtaining the necessary funds to purchase and operate the equipment. During the 1990s, little financing was available domestically. Government investment in FGD was small and banks were generally unwilling to provide loans for pollution control equipment as expensive as FGD. The S0 2 fee programme did not generate NEPA's desired level of funds for investment in air pollution control equipment, because the fee level was low and (as described above) fees were not collected regularly by EPBs.
The limited diffusion of FGD that did occur in China during the 1990s was accompli shed primarily with concessional financing. The World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the Japanese government have been the main sources of capital funds for FGD at Chinese power plants (Evans, 1999 ). Japan's Green Aid Plan appears to be the only source of foreign financing for FGD at Chinese enterprises outside the power sector (Ohshita, 2003; Watson , 2002) . With FGD requirements in the 2000 revisions to the Air Pollution Control Law, and another surge in power plant construction in 2004, cond itions for wider diffusion of FGD equipment in China are beginning to emerge. Today, most equ ipment is made domestically and costs have dropped to 400 yuan/kg.
CHALLENGES IN CO-ORDINATlNG ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM: THE CASE OF COAL WASHING
Despite government efforts to promote coal washing, the production of washed coal in China experienced ups and downs during the 1990s. This was the result, in part, of dispersed bureaucratic decision-making structures and difficulties in co-ordinating economic and environmental reforms. Our examination of coal washing technology highlights the difficulties of creating timely incentives for technology adopters during periods of dynamic reform , such as coal pricing liberalization and coal industry restructuring. The incentives for Chinese coal mines to adopt and utilize coal washing technology were strongly influenced by these economic reforms.
Coal Industry Restructuring and Coal Pricing Reforms
China 's coal mining industry has been characterized by four main ownership types: large state-owned mines (managed by the central government until 1998); small-and medium-sized state-owned mines managed by local governments; small, rural collective mines (mines that are township and village enterprises, or TVEs); and private mines (lEA, 1999b; Thomson, 1996) . The latter two types are often referred to as non-state mines. Figure 2 presents trends in coal production by these four types of mine ownership. In the early 1980s, more than half of China's coal was produced by the large, centrally-managed state-owned mines. Poor performance of the coal industry in the 1980s, accompanied by coal and electricity shortages, prompted the central government to relax ownership restrictions and encourage TVEs and other types of owners to expand production (lEA, 1999b). As a result, growth in Chinese coal production from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s came primarily from non-state mines.
Energy, particularly coal, was one of the last factors of production to be released from strict central planning by the Chinese government. Until the early 1990s, coal prices were controlled by the government and kept low in order to spur economic growth and prevent hardships for residents using coal for heating and cooking. While this policy benefited coal consumers, it caused the coal mining industry to become the largest loss-generating industrial sector of the Chinese economy (Rawski, 1994) .
As a first step in coal pricing reform, in 1993 the central government established a dual pricing system, whereby state-owned mines sold at a low, government-controlled price, and township and vi ll age mines sold at a market-determined price (lEA, 1999a: 104) . As market prices rose to nearly twice the artificia lly low state price, state-owned mines continued to experience heavy losses; nearly 90 per cent of state-owned mines reported losses in 1993 (lEA, 1999b) . The dual-pricing system also generated a great deal of corruption as low-priced state coal was illegally sold at higher market rates (Thomson, 1996) .
In 1994, state-owned mines were allowed to sell a portion of their coa l on the market. Despite this change, 72 per cent of state-owned coal mines still lost money in 1996, prompting the central government to liberalize all coal prices. With coal in high demand domestically and international oil prices boosting coal prices, many large state-owned mines began to move into the black in 1997 (l EA, 1999b).
The 1997 rise in coal prices was short-lived, however. The Asian financial crisis, coupled with Chinese domestic economic changes, led to an unexpected downturn in coal demand . After decades of demand exceeding supp ly, China experienced a coal glut. The small collective mines were most immediately affected , and their prod uction fell the same year. The decline in demand was accompanied by a drop in coal prices in early 1998. As losses began to mount, the government announced an overhaul of the coa l industry. The ninety-four large state-owned coal mines were transferred from central to local management, mostly to the provincial level. The 2,500 smaller mines owned by local governments were directed to improve efficiency. Of the 75 ,000 small mines run as TYEs, 25 ,800 were slated for closure in an effort to balance supply and demand, improve the overall efficiency of the industry, and reverse the drop in coal prices (lEA, 1999b ) .
14 At the end of 2001 , coal prices finall y began to rise and the state-owned mining sector as a whole began to generate profits again (Xinhua News Agency, 2002) . Increased demand for Chinese coa l exports and an upturn in domestic demand helped the industry. Continuing efforts to restrict sma ll non-state mines reduced excessive supply a nd generated some improvements in coal quality and mining safety. However, a 2004 surge in domestic and international demand has again raised safety and quality challenges for Chi na's coa l industry (AsiaPulse News, 2004) . Table 3 sum ma rizes key C hinese policies promoting coal wash ing technology during the 1990s. In 1994, the former Ministry of the Coal Industry announced its goa ls for expa ndin g the use of CCT, including coal washing techno logy (Zhu a nd Yu , 1999) . Promotion of coal washing in 1994 coincided with the second year of th e du a l pricing sys tem for coal and th e Ministry's efforts to improve coal qua lity and the profitabi lity of large state-owned mines. In 1995, rev isions to the Air Po ll ution Control Law also encouraged adoption of coa l washing technology a nd the use of washed coa l by industrial enterprises (H ao, 1996) . In 1996, NEPA, with approval by the State Council , began a drive to decrease production of low quality coal Called fo r the closure of small mines, many wi th high-sulphur coal ; red uced competition ca n help improve adoption of coal washing techn ology by medium and la rge mines. Coal washing identified as one of fo urteen techno logies; viewed as fundamental CCT fo r China.
Policies P romoting Coal Washing
Called for coal washing as one of severa l meas ures to control S0 2 and particulate matter air po llutio n. Co nta ined a few coa l washin g projects, representing a sma ll subset of the national CCT pla n. Ba nned th e opening of new mines with coal having > 3% sulphur; restricted existing mines with >3% S; ca lled fo r new or expa nding mines with > 1.5% S to insta ll coa l washing techn ology; ca lled fo r ex isting mines with > 1.5% S to ado pt coal washing in stages.
Rein fo rced requirements for S0 2 co nt ro l, including coal sulphur restric ti o ns. F urther pro moted coa l washing, as we ll as fuel swi tching.
by closing small non-state mines (State Co uncil , 1996) . Targets for growth in coal washing appeared in 1997, as part of the Ninth Five Year Pl an (Du and Liu, 1999) . From a coal washing rate of roughly 25 per cent in 1995, the central government planned to increase the rate to 30 per cent by 2000 and to reach 40 -50 per cent by 2010 (JCOAL, 1998) . The strongest policy push for coal washing carne in 1998, when the State Council approved SEPA's Two Control Zones policy (State Council , 1998; SEPA, 1998b) . The policy required new and existing mines in the acid rain control zone and the air pollution control zones to ado pt coal washing technology based on the sulphur content of mined coal. Local governments were forbidden to issue permits to proposed new mines whose coal sulphur content would be above 3 per cent. Existing mines with a coal sulphur content greater than 3 per cent were to be closed or have their production restricted. As deta iled in Table 3 , requirements for mines with lower coal sulphur content were less strict.
Policies promoting coal washing reflect increased co-ordination by central government agencies in response to their overlapping economic, energy a nd environmental interests and objectives in the late 1990s. When coal pricing liberalization and coal industry restructuring encountered an unexpected downturn in coal demand , the economic and industry ministries gave pri ority to the promotion of coal washing a nd closure of small non-state mines, which was consistent with SEPA's efforts to curb coal-related ai r pollution. As shown below, coal washing increased as the different priorities of centra l gove rnment agencies became more closely ali gned and burea ucratic coordination improved. The trend in coal washing during the 1990s points to the benefits of co-ordinating economic and environmental reforms, so as to create consistent policy signa ls and incentives to which enterprises can respond.
Incentives and Barriers to Coal Washing
China met some of its goals for coal washing during the 1990s: in percentage terms, it achieved its target of 30 per cent by 2000. But the production of washed coal in abso lute terms (Mt/year) did not reach levels hoped for by Chinese officials. Figure 3 illustrates trends in the production of washed coal, based on data from China's large state-owned mines (LBNL, 2004) . Coking coal is the dominant form of washed coal, and is used by the iron and steel secto r. A smaller share of washed steam coal is used mostly by electric power plants (CCPUA and EPRI , 2000: 3-10) . Between 1980 and 1990, the production of washed coal at large state-owned mines rose slowly, encouraged mainly by government subsidies and directed by central planni ng. After a slight dip in 1991 and 1992, production rose in 1993, coinciding with the liberalization of coal prices. In 1997, washed coal production by the la rge mines reached an all-time high. In 1998 a nd 1999, production of washed coal fell sharply, following declines in export and domestic demand , as well as the drop in coal prices. By 2000, the production of washed coa l was on the rise again , and by 2002 productio n had surpassed the 1997 peak. The price that mines are able to charge for washed coal is a key determinant in their decision to adopt a nd operate coal washing technology. While coal prices va ry substantially in China depending on the destination of the coal , with transportation costs acco unting for as much as 70 per cent of the delivered price (World Ba nk , 1997), we can make a few generalizations. When coal prices were depressed , as they were before the 1996 price liberalization and during the 1997-99 glut, the price differential between washed a nd unwashed coal was substa ntia l. For example, when the run-of-mine price for unwashed coal (that is, the price of coal at the mine, before transport and delivery) was around I 00 yuan (US$ 12) 15 per ton, the price of washed coal was an additional 50 yuan (US$ 6) per ton (CCPUA and EPRI , 2000) . Thus the run-of-mine price for washed coal was 50 per cent hig her than the price for unwashed coal. In terms of the price of delivered coal, which is the price most directly experienced by the coal consumer, the difference is smaller but still notable: prices for delivered washed coal were I 0 to 20 per cent higher tha n those for unwashed coal.
15. Co nve rsion based on a typica l 1998 excha nge rate of 8.32 yuan/US$ I.
Demand for washed coal -another determinant in a mine's decision to adopt and operate coal washing technology -has been strong in the steel and electric power sectors, but generally weak in other industrial sectors. Many industrial enterprises were unable to use washed coal because they had outmoded boiler technology (CCPUA and EPRI, 2000; Fang et al. , 1999) . In addition , enterprises that were not pressed to meet so2 standards may not have felt the need to pay I 0 to 20 per cent more for washed coal. As a result, demand for washed coal was generally low outside the steel and electric utility sectors, and many mines were not able to charge enough to cover the additional production costs for washed coal, especially washed steam coal (JCOAL, 1998) .
Mines that did have incentives to operate coal washing facilities during the 1990s were primarily large state-owned mines producing relatively high quality coal for export or for sale to domestic steel plants and electric utilities. In contrast to these large mines, the many small and medium-size coal mines in China had weaker incentives: small Chinese mines operate at a low technological level and cannot take advantage of economies of scale.
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In general, small mines produce low quality coal and sell it locally; they do not compete in higher-priced export markets. Because of their size, small mines tend to sell to small enterprises that are Jess likely to purchase washed coal. With limited technical resources, modest finances and limited demand for washed coal, small mines generally did not adopt coal washing technology during the 1990s. Recognizing the weak incentives and capabilities at small mines, some researchers have suggested that local governments should support the construction of centralized coal washing facilities that use simple technology (Ohshita, 2003) .
The promotion of coal washing was thus affected by fragmented decision making in the Chinese bureaucracy. While there was a trend toward greater co-ordination among central government agencies, and although the interests of economic, industrial and environmental ministries were increasingly overlapping at the end of the 1990s, decentralization made it more difficult for the centre to push its agenda at the local level. Data on coal washing how that production of washed coal became more closely linked with the market as the reforms progressed . As coal pricing reform and coal industry restructuring changed incentives for state-owned mines, the decisions of mines and local government to produce washed coal became more heavily influenced by economic signa ls. Coal washing is likely to increase as industria l modernization enables more enterprises to improve their combustion technology and realize the benefits of washed coal. However, as long as small mines and small industrial coal consumers continue to exist in large numbers, technologies and implementation efforts targeted at small-scale enterprises will be needed to realize widespread air quality benefits.
CONCLUS IO NS
China 's experience with CCT demonstrates some degree of greening of the C hinese state, whilst highlighting that significant effort is stilled needed to reconcile environmental protection with economic development. Policies on the closure of small coalmines a nd limits on coal sulphur content are positive examples of co-ordination of central government plans for energy, environment and economic development -consistent with a 'win-wi n' ecologica l modernization paradigm . In contrast, fragmented authority of cen tral government agencies during policy formulation on so2 fees contributed to the poor diffusion of FGD. Improved co-ordination among central government agencies can provide clear and consistent signa ls to both local officials and enterprises. Linking economic policies with environmental goals can promote adoption of cleaner technology by emphasizing economically-favourable approaches (for example, improved fuel quality a nd energy efficiency) that simultaneously reduce energy-related pollution and promote economic development.
The CCT experience also shows that central agencies have encountered difficulties with policy implementation and enforcement by local governments. As a consequence of economic reform s during the 1990s, especially the imposit ion of hard budget constraints a nd increased market liberalization, loca l govern ments prioritized improving the economic performa nce of the enterprises in their jurisdiction. Enforcement of environmental policies generally received lower priority. This difficulty with enforcement has two implications. First, loca l government leaders need incentives that reward them for implementing national environmental policies. Such incentives could be provided, for example, by changing the tax treatment of investments in clea ner technology, or by increasing the emphasis on environmental achievements within C hina 's formal sys tem for evaluating the performance of government officials. Second, central government intervention is sti ll needed to cou nter ma rket signals that lead to actions with negative environmenta l impacts.
Finally, the greening process is on ly beginning to extend to C hinese industry. To improve the diffusion of CCT, regulatory incentives for enterprises need to be a ugmented. During the 1990s, low emission fees and weak implementation of some ai r pollution control requirements provided little motivation for enterprises to invest in CCT. T his could change by increasing so2 fees to levels that are compa rable to the costs of installing and operating equipme nt wit h lower em iss ions. In ad dition , domesti c financing packages (such as tax breaks and low-interest loa ns) could spur investmen ts in pollution control by enterprises, and encourage further development of enterprises that manufacture low-cost CCT eq uipment within China. Wider di ssemin ation of information on the economic benefits of cleaner coal technol ogies could a lso promote technology diffusion and ecologica l modernization among Chinese enterprises.
